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THE GOULED RULE: CURRENT UTILITY
INTRODUCTION
Within the literal statement of the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution, no reference is made as to what type of material is
lawfully subject to search and seizure. In fact, the amendment gives the
impression that anything is the lawful subject of seizure so long as the
place to be searched "and the persons or things to be seized" are "par-
ticularly described." However, the Supreme Court has not so interpreted
this amendment. Their interpretation of the amendment limits the type of
articles subject to seizure. This limitation is known as the Gouled Rule.'
The discussion which follows deals primarily with the Rule's development
and application to various factual situations. In this discussion the question
impliedly raised but left unanswered can be stated: Due to the confusion
in the courts concerning the Rule's application, what is the current
utility of having such a Rule?
THE RULE
Prior to any discussion of the Gouled Rule and the problems arising
thereunder, one basic principle should be kept in mind. Since the Rule is
concerned with the type of evidence which is subject to lawful seizure
and use at trial, it presupposes the lawfulness of the search involved.
Therefore, in the discussion which follows concerning the materials seized
by various officials, it must be remembered that the issue of the validity
of a particular search warrant or of the lawfulness of the search incident
to a lawful arrest has already been determined in each particular case.
The Rule emerged from the United States Supreme Court case of
Gouled v. United States.2 In this case Gouled and others were indicted on
two counts: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States government
through the use of fraudulent contracts for clothing and equipment, and
(2) use of the mail to promote the fraudulent scheme. Government agents,
pursuant to a valid search warrant, seized documents in order to prove
the bribery of an officer of the United States. The evidential problem
from which the Rule emerged involved the seizure by federal officials of
an unexecuted contract between Gouled and another party, a written
contract signed by the defendant, and a bill for attorney's fees which had
been rendered by one of the defendants under the original indictment.
The Court held all three inadmissible stating:
. . . they [search warrants] may not be used as a means of
gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for
1. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
2. Ibid.
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the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used
against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but that they may
be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and
seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the
complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the
right to possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police
power renders possession of the property by the accused unlaw-
ful and provides that it may be taken
In connection with the unexecuted contract and the attorney's bill, the
"Government could desire [their] possession only to use [them] as evidence
against the defendant and to search for and seize [them] for such purpose
was unlawful."4 In determining the status of the signed contract, the
Court recognized the possibility that such contracts might be used as an
agency or instrumentality in the perpetration of bribery or a fraud upon
the government, and thus give the government "a legitimate and im-
portant interest in seizing such a paper in order to prevent further frauds."
However, the Court determined that "the facts necessary to give this
contract such a character do not appear. . . ."' Though not as clear as
one may desire, and though not the first case in which this evidential
problem appeared,6 this decision gave the Rule its name. Today the Rule
holds that objects of only an evidential value which merely aid in proving
the guilt of an accused may not be seized by federal officials, and, if seized,
may not be used as evidence in seeking a conviction.
The constitutional basis for the Rule is the fourth amendment prohibi-
tion of illegal searches and seizures, complemented by the fifth amend-
ment prohibition of self-incrimination. The Court in Gouled stated: "...
they [merely evidential material] having been seized in an unconstitu-
tional search, to permit them to be used in evidence would be in effect, as
ruled in the Boyd case, to compel the defendant to become a witness
against himself."' In Boyd,8 the Court stated:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense, but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property. . . .Breaking into a house and
opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation;
but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testi-
3. Id. at 309.
4. Id. at 310.
5. Ibid.
6. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell
St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
7. Supra note 1, at 311.
8. Supra note 6.
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mony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation
of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments run almost into each other. 9
Since the recognition of the Rule by the Supreme Court, this consti-
tutional basis has not been questioned.' ° In fact, since the Rule's formula-
tion, most of the lower federal courts have applied the Rule by merely
citing Gouled as their principal authority" along with other similar cases.
Since the Court in Gouled did not elaborate on a rationale to support
such a rule, and since most courts have accepted the Rule on faith
without making explicit their reasons for its application, the question
arises as to exactly why such a distinction between "seizable" and "non-
seizable" material should be made. Two alternative rationales have been
suggested. On the one hand, there is the "property" rationale which has
been stated recently to be:
The type of evidence which may legitimately be seized extends
only to property which does not belong to the possessor or
whose right to possession he has forfeited in some manner recog-
nizable under the law. Such forfeiture may be brought on either
by using or planning to use the property in the commission
of a crime.' 2 [Footnote omitted.]
An example of "property which does not belong to the possessor" would
simply be some form of stolen property. "Forfeited" property would be
such objects as weapons used in a crime or other instrumentalities used
in its commission."
On the other hand, there exists the "privacy" rationale. It has been
briefly stated in this manner:
Privacy is already protected to an extent through Supreme Court
interpretation of the unreasonable search clause of the Consti-
9. Id. at 630.
10. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) for an example of how the
basis is mentioned without comment.
11. See Peeples v. United States, 341 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 844 (1963); Zachary v. United
States, 275 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1960) ; In re Ginsburg, 147 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Bushouse
v. United States, 67 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1933); United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202
(2d Cir. 1926); United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Sunp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1951); United
States v. Chodak, 68 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1946); United States v. Richmond, 57 F. Supp.
903 (S.D. W. Va. 1944).
12. State v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 269, 373 P.2d 392, 400 (1962).
13. For some examples, see: Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Robinson
v. United States, 327 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1964); Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.
1933); United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930).
[Vol. 4:582
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tution. But the safeguards of a reasonable search apply mainly
to the original entry. It is arguable that the drafters of the Con-
stitution intended to further protect a man's privacy by im-
munizing from seizure certain of his personal property. The
Constitution explicitly distinguished between houses, papers and
effects. 14 [Footnote omitted.]
Another statement of this rationale that also exemplifies the danger to
the Gouled Rule if this basis were adopted by most courts can be found
in United States v. Poller.'5
. . . the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the
search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists
in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against
him. If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make
so much difference what is taken away, since the officers will
ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and
there can be no sound policy in protecting what does. 6 [Em-
phasis added.]
Even though other language in the case recognizes the limitations im-
posed by the Gouled Rule, language similar to that quoted above perhaps
warns against the adoption of such a privacy-oriented rationale. For,
since the reasoning of the Court suggests that it might "not make so
much difference what is taken away," [emphasis added], one can see
what effect such a view would have on the distinctions drawn by the
Gouled Rule. However, the Rule has been sustained under either
rationale.1
7
The Rule was expressed most clearly in Harris v. United States: 8
This court has frequently recognized the distinction between
merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not
be seized under the authority of a search warrant or during
the course of a search incident to arrest, and on the other hand,
those objects which may validly be seized including the instru-
mentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits
of crime such as stolen property, weapons by which escape of
the person arrested might be effected, and propbrty the posses-
sion of which is a crime.' 9
14. Comment, 20 U. Cm. L. REV. 319, 327 (1953).
15. Supra note 13.
16. United States v. Poller, supra note 13, at 914.
17. For a discussion of these rationales, see: Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:
Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664 (1961); Comment, supra
note 14.
18. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Attached to the dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., can
be found an appendix of cases dealing with the "seizability" of evidence.
19. Id. at 154.
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The Rule still has much vitality in the courts today.2" It has become
the basis upon which search warrants may be issued under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.21 Similar statutes are in effect in some
states,22 while others must rely upon interpretation of their constitution
if such a rule is to be adopted.3 It has been applied to searches pursuant
to a lawful search warrant24 and to searches incidental to a lawful arrest.25
Conversely, the Rule has been applied where neither of these situations
occur.
A fortiori, if purely evidentiary material may not be seized even
under a search warrant, as in Gouled, or as an incident to an
arrest under an arrest warrant, as in Lefkowitz, it cannot be
seized legally without any warrant whatsoever and without
any arrest.2 6
The Gouled Rule, however, is subject to certain limitations. The first
of these seems to have evolved from a statement by the Court in Weeks
v. United States:2
7
What then is the present case? Before answering that inquiry
specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion to state
what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right on the part of
the Government, always recognized under English and American
law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested
to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right
has been uniformly maintained in many cases.8 [Emphasis
added.]
This -approach seems to hold that materials taken from the person of an
accused pursuant to a valid search need not fall into one of the categories
established by the Gouled Rule. While the problem as yet has not been
faced by the Court, there are a few federal cases which seem to be in
agreement with this exception and would follow it when necessary. In
20. For a list of cases in the lower federal courts which have followed the Rule, see
supra note 14 at 319-20.
21. Rule 41-(b) of FED. R. Cant. P. states: Grounds for Issuance. A warrant may
be issued under this rule to search and seize any property: (1) Stolen 6r embezzled in
violation of the laws of the United States; or (2) Designed or intended for use or which
is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense; or (3) Possessed, con-
trolled, or designed or intended for use or which is or has been used in violation of Title 18,
U.S.C., § 957.
22. See ORS 141.010 for Oregon's statute.
23. See PA. CONST. art. 1 § 8.
24. Gouled v. United States, supra note 1.
25. United States v. Lefkowitz, supra note 10; Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960).
26. Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
27. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28. Id. at 392.
[Vol. 4:592
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United States v. Kirschenblatt,9 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated: "It is true that the law-has never distinguished between
documents and other property found upon the person of one arrested.
All may be used in the trial, so far as relevant."3 Quite recently, the
Supreme Court has again mentioned this principle:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for
example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which
might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well
as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the
crime -things which might easily happen where the weapon
or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate
control. 1 [Emphasis added.]
Even though there is no case directly in point, and, since there are strong
indications of the Court's view on the matter, one may reasonably con-
clude that searches of the person do represent a limitation on the
Gouled" Rule.
The "public records" exception represents another limitation on the
Gouled Rule. The case most often cited for this exception is Davis v.
United States.32 It dealt with the illegal possession of gasoline stamps by
the accused. Obviously, since such possession was a crime, the stamps
could have been seized under that part of the Gouled Rule which permits
the seizure and use of material the possession of which is a crime. How-
ever, the Court recognized the right to seize the stamps on the basis of the
so-called "public records" exception stating: "Where the officers seek to
inspect public documents at the place of business where they are required
to be kept, permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as where
private papers are sought.133 The Court in Davis relied heavily upon
another Supreme Court case, Wilson v. United States.3 4 This case dealt
with the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum requiring a corporation to
produce certain records. The Court held that the holder of such documents
is only a custodian against their compulsory production. The Court
continued:
The principle applies not only to public documents in public
offices, but also to records required by law to be kept in order
that there may be suitable information of transactions which
29. 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926).
30. Id. at 203.
31. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
32. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
33. Id. at 593.
34. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
35. Id. at 380.
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are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and
the enforcement of restrictions validly established."
In discussing the basis for the exception, the Court stated:
The fundamental ground of decision in this class of cases, is
that where, by virtue of their character and the rules of law
applicable to them, the books and papers are held subject to
examination by the demanding authority, the custodian has
no privilege to refuse production although their contents tend
to criminate him. In assuming their custody he has accepted
the incident obligation to permit inspection. 7
Therefore, in the area of public documents, the distinctions drawn by the
Gouled Rule have no application.3"
Along with the right to seize and use public records, there exists a
corresponding right of inspection by the officials. That is, officials may
enter places of business to examine such documents. This right is subject
to a very important qualification. In Hughes v. Johnson,39 the limitation
was stated in this manner:
It is, however, implicit in Davis v. United States, ... , that the
right to inspect does not carry with it the right, without warrant
and in absence of arrest, to reach that which is to be inspected
by a resort to self-help in the face of the owner's protest. In
Davis, the seizure was upheld for the reason that it was volun-
tary; that, as a matter of fact, consent had been obtained...."
Thus, either consent, a valid search warrant, or a search incidental to an
arrest is needed to have the right to inspect.4 '
Another qualification of the Gouled Rule was discussed in Hester v.
United States.4 2 In this case, the challenged evidence was testimony of
revenue officers concerning the finding of moonshine whiskey in a broken
jug and other vessels in the vicinity of the defendant's house. This evidence
was introduced in an effort to prove the concealment of distilled spirits
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 381-82.
38. For a very recent case applying the exception, see Peeples v. United States, supra
note 11.
39. 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
40. Id. at 69.
41. For additional cases on inspection, see Shafer v. United States, 229 F.2d 124 (4th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956) where it was held that an inspection of a
farm under the Agricultural Adjustment Act did not violate the fourth amendment;
United States v. Crescent-Kelvan Co., 164 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1948) where it was held that
an inspection of the premises and records of a drug manufacturer under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not violate the fourth amendment.
42. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
[Vol. 4:582
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in violation of the revenue statutes. Obviously, these vessels were used
as instruments in the commission of the crime charged. Therefore, they
could have been admitted as instrumentalities under the Gouled Rule.
Instead of admitting them on this ground, the Court held that their was
no seizure in the legal sense and stated that "the officers examined the
contents of each after it had been abandoned.14 3 The Court then added:
".. . the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the
people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, is not extended to the
open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as
the common law."44 It would seem from this language that material of an
"evidential value only" may be seized if abandoned. In Friedman v.
United States,45 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held this
principle to be applicable regardless of the nature of the place where the
articles are found. In Friedman, the defendants were on trial for mail
fraud. The challenged evidence was the inactive files of the defendants
which they had left on the floor and in a metal trash barrel. The defendant
lessees, unable to pay the rent, evacuated the premises. After holding that
"abandonment is an ultimate fact or conclusion based generally upon a
combination of act and intent,"46 the court determined that such abandon-
ment had been proven by clear and decisive evidence. Thus, abandonment
can be established in relation to material enclosed within a structure of
some sort, as well as material found in "fields." '47
Although important because of the elucidation which they furnish, the
cases discussing this qualification of the Gouled Rule are also important
for another reason. In this specific area of "seizability" of evidence, the
courts distinguish between "possessed" property and "abandoned" prop-
erty in determining which can be lawfully seized. As noted previously,
most courts accept the Rule without much attempt at explanation of the
rationale. Since the abandonment qualification is a property concept, and
since the courts in discussing this qualification seem to be extremely inter-
ested in the alternative concept of possession, it seems reasonable to state
that the courts in using such concepts have implicitly accepted the "prop-
erty" rationale as opposed to the "privacy" rationale.
Another decision of the Supreme Court which seems to qualify the
applicability of the Gouled Rule in a different area is Kremen v. United
States.4 The crimes charged in this case were harboring a fugitive from
justice and conspiracy to do so. Government agents searched petitioners'
43. Id. at 58.
44. Id. at 59.
45. 347 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1965).
46. Id. at 704.
47. See also United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962); Abel v. United
States, supra note 24; United States v. Wheeler, 161 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
48. 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
1965-19661
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cabin and seized its entire contents, including such items as sleeping bags,
soap, clothes, pens and pencils, cash and numerous other articles.49 The
prosecution used only a few of these articles in convicting the petitioners.
The Court stated: "While the evidence seized from the persons of the
petitioners might have been legally admissible, the introduction against
each of petitioners of some items seized in the house in the manner afore-
said rendered the guilty verdicts illegal."50 [Emphasis added.] Thus, the
Court was impressed with the manner in which this search was carried
out rather than the objects seized. They were "shocked" by such police
conduct. No justification existed for the police stripping the cabin of all
movable objects. It would have been a simple task for the prosecution
to have established that sleeping bags and other similar articles were
actually instrumentalities used in the commission of the alleged crime,
viz. harboring a criminal, but judging from the Court's language, such an
argument would have been to no avail. Thus, police conduct itself may
be enough to warrant the refusal of evidence at trial.
While, on one hand, the nature of articles seized and the conduct of the
search have been examined by many courts, on the other hand, consent as
a factor in refusing to apply the limitations of the Gouled Rule has not
been the subject of too many decisions." The concept of consent under
the Rule differs according to whether the "property" or the "privacy"
rationale is adopted; however, under either approach, consent can be
justified as a limitation on the Rule. Under the "property" rationale, since
it is based upon title and possession, consent by the title holder to such
a search and seizure would seem to be all that is necessary. Under the
"privacy" rationale, since it is based upon one's right to be free from
unwarranted intrusions,"2 it would seem to be easier to accept consent as
a limitation on the Rule than it would be under the "property" rationale.
Since intrusions are unwarranted when performed unlawfully, and since
they are unlawful when no permission has been received for them, then
it logically follows that it is impossible to have an unwarranted intrusion
when consent has been granted. Thus, there arises no question of who is
the title holder, nor any question of right to possession, nor any question
of forfeiture of such right as would arise under the "property" rationale.
Only one question need be answered: Has the party consented to this
interruption of his privacy?
In the areas which have been discussed, the Gouled Rule itself and its
exceptions are easily understood. However, while an understanding of the
Rule and its exceptions is not overly difficult as an abstract proposition,
49. An 11-page appendix was necessary to list the articles. Id. at 349.
50. Id. at 347-48.
51. Hughes v. Johnson, supra note 39; United States v. Thompson, 113 F.2d 643
(7th Cir. 1940).
52. See United States v. Poller, supra note 13.
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a real problem arises in the practical application of the Rule. Often, the
application of a rule of law is the most difficult step in its use. In the case
of the Gouled Rule, because of some misapplications and the use of un-
clear language, confusion and inconsistency mark the present status of
the Rule.
APPLICATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
As early as 1927, in Marron v. United States,53 the Supreme Court
rendered a decision which when discussed and followed in later cases has
led to some confusion. The case dealt with violations of the prohibition
laws. In a search of the premises wherein it was alleged that the sale of
intoxicants had taken place, federal agents uncovered, among other things,
a ledger showing inventories of liquors handled by the illegal operation.
In holding this evidence admissible, the Court stated: ". . . if the ledger
was not as essential to the maintenance of the establishment as were
bottles, liquors and glasses, it was none the less a part of the outfit or
equipment actually used to commit the offense. . .. " In other words,
the ledger was an instrumentality used in the commission of the crime
charged. This was a reasonable conclusion for the Court to reach.
Obviously, in any business, records must be kept. These records could
be considered as essential to any sales operation as the delivery of the
goods to the buyer. However, the Court did not stop with this admission
into evidence. During the search, the agents also seized such items as
bills for the various utilities as well as some receipts recording "gifts" to
certain police officers. The Court also admitted these items stating:
The bills for gas, electric light, water and telephone services
disclosed items of expense; they were convenient, if not in fact
necessary, for the keeping of the accounts; and, as they were
so closely related to the business, it is not unreasonable to con-
sider them as used to carry it on. It follows that the ledger and
bills were lawfully seized as an incident to an arrest.55
Even though the alleged illegal acts took place in a structure requiring
the use of utilities, and even though such bills were necessary to balance
the accounts in the ledger, does it necessarily follow that they should
have been admitted? Merely because a particular item was essential to
the proper keeping of the books, and the books are determined to have
been instrumentalities of a crime, should it have followed that they, too,
were instrumentalities within the Gouled Rule? While it was quite reason-
able for the Court to have concluded that the ledger was essential to the
commission of a crime, it was not reasonable for the Court to have con-
53. Supra note 13.
54. Id. at 199.
55. Ibid.
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cluded that an electric bill was actually an instrumentality. The confusion
which this holding created in later cases dealing with ledgers and
analogously related primary books of account was great; but the applica-
tion of the Rule regarding bills has proved to be nearly impossible.
Subsequent to Marron, in another case dealing with violations of the
prohibition laws, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lejkowitz56
again faced the problem of the type of evidence which is "seizable." In
this case, the alleged crime was conspiracy to sell, possess, transport and
take orders for intoxicating liquors contrary to the law. Among the
articles refused admittance by the Court were several lists of names and
addresses (probably of customers), a blank order book with some slips
torn out, two electric bills, thirty-two-odd salesmens' order slips for
intoxicating liquors with customers' names and addresses, and several
receipts with amounts of money written on them. The Court attempted
to distinguish this case from Marron by discussing the type of search
conducted by the agents in both cases. It held that in Marron the objects
seized were openly displayed while in the case before them the agents
were overeager to "get" what they could on the defendants. If the Court
would have stopped there, basing its holding completely on the shocking
and exploratory nature of the search, there would not have arisen any
confusion over the law of "seizability." The decision would have been
just another example of the limitation on the Gouled Rule dealing with
the nature of the search conducted by officials. However, this was not
the case. The Court went on to discuss the nature of the evidence seized:
"Though intended to be used to solicit orders for liquor in violation of the
Act, the papers and other articles found and taken were in themselves
unoffending. ' 57 While standing by itself, such a statement would seem to
be the more reasonable application of the Gouled Rule. But, when com-
pared with the Marron decision, it becomes obvious that Lejkowitz is
definitely inconsistent. Articles as indirectly related to the commission of
a crime as utility bills were held seizable in Marron, while identical articles
were held not seizable in Lefkowitz. Also, in Lefkowitz articles as closely
related to the crime charged as completely filled in order blanks were held
"unoffending." It is certainly not unreasonable to conclude that such order
forms are a necessary tool in the sale of illegal liquors and are as well
"closely related" to the conspiracy to make such sales. However, if the
Court would have deemed such a conclusion to have been unreasonable,
and attempted to distinguish the cases along the lines of the crimes and
evidence involved in each case, perhaps such confusion and apparent in-
consistency could have been avoided. But, as will be discussed later, such
was not the case. As a result of such decisions as these, subsequent courts
56. Supra note 10.
57. Id. at 465.
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have found it quite difficult to apply the Gouled Rule in similar situa-
tions."8
The confusion over the applicability of the Gouled Rule is not limited
to the older Supreme Court cases. Recently, in Abel v. United States,59
the Court was faced with a similar problem. The crime charged was con-
spiracy to commit espionage. Immigration and naturalization service
officers arrested the petitioner on a warrant for deportation. In searching
his hotel room, the officers seized some articles which led to the conspiracy
charge. Among the articles seized were: a piece of paper with an alleged
coded message on it, a forged birth certificate, a birth certificate of a
person who had been dead for over fifty years, and a bank book in the
same name as that on the dead person's birth certificate. After accurately
mentioning the hopeless confusion resulting from such cases as Marron
and Lejkowitz, the Court added to the uncertainty by admitting these
articles and others as instrumentalities used in the commission of the
crime.
In the context of the facts of this case, it might be considered a rational
determination to call such articles as birth certificates instrumentalities
of the crime of conspiracy to commit espionage. But, when considered in
the light of the two prior cases, the confusion added by Abel becomes
evident. In Maron, the Court admitted a ledger and certain utility bills
in a prosecution for the sale of intoxicating liquors. In Lefkowitz, the
Court refused to admit completely filled-in order forms for liquor sales
in a prosecution for conspiracy to sell, possess, and take orders for intox-
icating liquors. As was briefly alluded to earlier, a possible explanation
for the Court's refusal to admit the articles in Lefkowitz could have been
that the Court felt that a distinction between the crime of selling illegal
liquors and the crime of conspiracy to sell them was justifiable. For
evidentiary matters, order forms, while logically an instrumentality in
the crime of selling illegal liquors, were not such an instrumentality in a
conspiracy crime. This distinction could have been one possible way of
reconciling Marron and Lefkowitz. But the Abel decision blurs this ap-
proach. This case was also a conspiracy prosecution. To be consistent
with the attempted reconciliation discussed above, the Court in Abel,
since it was adjudicating a conspiracy crime, should have ruled the seized
evidence inadmissible. In admitting the evidence and, as in Lejkowitz,
with no attempt at explanation other than a declaration that the articles
involved were instrumentalities of a crime, Abel did nothing more than
create additional confusion.
58. See Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Foley v. United States,
supra note 13; Bushouse v. United States, supra note 11.
59. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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The Court in A bel is confusing not merely in its application of the Rule,
but also in its language. The Court stated:
Nor is there any constitutional reason to limit the search for
materials proving the deportability of an alien, when validly
arrested, more severely than we limit the search for materials
probative of crime when a valid criminal arrest is made. The
need for the proof is as great in one case as in the other, for
deportation can be accomplished only after a hearing at which
deportability is established."0 [Emphasis added.]
This language, while it does not indicate any lack of understanding of
the Rule, seems to emphasize the privilege to search for and seize probative
material. Such an emphasis, if present, is contrary to the Rule as originally
stated in the Gouled case.61 From other language in the case, as well as
from the cases previously cited, it is at least certain that the Rule as an
abstract principle is understood by the Court. The difficulty with the
language quoted above probably rests on nothing more than an unfor-
tunate choice of terms. Nevertheless, as experience shows, such judicial
utterances lead to more confusion in subsequent cases.
Nor is the confusion as to the proper application of the Gouled Rule
limited to the Supreme Court cases. In United States v. Alvarado,62 a
narcotics prosecution, the evidence challenged was a matchbook cover
upon which was written the name and address of the post office box
where the defendant had arranged the delivery of the marihuana, and an
address book containing the name and address of defendant's accomplice.
The address book was seized from the defendant's person while he was
attempting to hide it. Thus, the seizure and admittance of this article
can be justified under the limitation of the Gouled Rule dealing with
searches of the person. However, the matchbook cover was not on the
defendant's person. It was in an ash tray in his apartment. Its discovery
occurred when an agent in the process of searching the apartment
accidentally knocked over the ash tray and spilled its contents on the
floor. The testimony shows that the defendant made an attempt to get
the article, but was too late. The agent had already seized it. The court
held these articles admissible citing this language from Abel as con-
trolling: "An arresting officer is free to take hold of articles which he sees
the accused deliberately trying to hide. This power derives from the
dangers that a weapon will be concealed, or that relevant evidence will be
destroyed."' This "power" to seize articles that an accused in trying to
hide would seem to be nothing more than another way of stating the
60. Id. at 236.
61. Gouled v. United States, supra note 4.
62. 321 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1963).
63. Supra note 59, at 238.
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Gouled limitation on searches of the person. 4 Such a rationale would
justify a seizure of the address book. But, to use this same rationale as a
justification for a seizure of the matchbook cover does not seem proper.
If the cover had been found on his person, then regardless of whether
is was considered an instrumentality or only evidence, it would have been
admissible. But, since it was found on the floor, the language of the court
does not seem to reasonably warrant its admissibility into evidence.
Perhaps two possible theories exist upon which the court could have
reasonably admitted the matchbook cover. On the one hand, the court
could have determined this article to have been closely enough related
to the commission of the crime charged to be considered an instrumen-
tality used in its commission. In so doing, the court would not have been
without authority. 5 Without attempting to justify such a determination
as a proper application of the Gouled Rule, at least the court would have
been justified in following such authority. On the other hand, the court
could have admitted the matchbook cover on the abandonment theory.
As was stated earlier,8 the courts are unwilling to extend the constitutional
protections against illegal searches and seizures to property with which
the accused has shown an intent to have no further relationship. Thus,
it could have been determined that, having placed the article in an ash
tray, the defendant expressed sufficient intent to sever any further prop-
erty relationship with it. A determination of this sort would have met with
the argument that the defendant, because he was the occupant of the
apartment, had possession of everything in it. And, since possession, as a
common law property concept, includes the elements of intent and control,
-his occupancy of the premises could be argued to include constructive
possession of all the articles found in it. However, since abandonment is
"a combination of act and intent,"6 and since the defendant by the act
of placing the matchbook cover in a receptacle normally used to "get
rid" of unwanted articles showed sufficient intent to abandon, the
argument could have been easily met notwithstanding the location of
the ash tray.6
Many other cases in the federal system show not only possible mis-
application of the Rule, but also the inconsistencies which exist among
the various federal circuits. In Morrison v. United States, 9 the defendant
was charged with a perverted sexual act on a young boy. Pursuant to a
search of the defendant's home, the police officers found a handkerchief
64. See Preston v. United States, supra note 31.
65. See Zackary v. United States, 275 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1960); Landau v. United
States Attorney, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936).
66. Supra, p. 9.
67. Friedman v. United States, supra note 45, at 704.
68. See ibid. for an analogous situation.
69. 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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which allegedly bore some tangible evidence of the offense, probably in
the form of traces of seminal fluid. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia refused to admit the article: "The handkerchief was merely
evidentiary material. It clearly was not the instrument or means by
which the crime was committed, the fruits of a crime, a weapon by which
escape might be effected, or property the possession of which is a crime."7 °
As is evident from the quote, the court adhered to the Gouled Rule almost
literally. What is unusual about this case is that it is one of the first cases
which have extended the Rule's application to articles other than written
documents and similar articles.71 There seems to be nothing confusing
about this decision when considered alone. However, in this same year,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit faced a similar problem in
United States v. Guido.72 The crime charged in this case was bank
robbery. In the process of robbing the bank, one of the robbers left a
distinct footprint, of which several photographs were taken. Pursuant
to a search warrant, F.B.I. agents searched the defendant's apartment
and seized a pair of shoes whose prints matched those in the photographs.
In admitting these shoes into evidence, the court held them to be instru-
mentalities used in the commission of a crime, such as a mask or a pair
of gloves would be. If the assumption that it is desirable to extend the
Gouled Rule as far as "the sweeping mandates of Boyd, Gouled, Lefkowitz
and Harris' 73 call for is made, it is submitted that the above-mentioned
cases while on the surface inconsistent on the extension of the Rule be-
yond paper documents are also inconsistent under either an extended or
contracted application of the Gouled Rule. It is true that in Morrison the
handkerchief was not used until after the perverted act was completed.
But, as has been discussed earlier, courts will admit articles which have
a close or direct relationship to the commission of the crime. The im-
mediacy of the handkerchief's use to the perverted act itself is enough
to establish a sufficiently direct relationship for it to have been considered
an instrumentality.
The objections against the Guido case rest upon a different basis.
Obviously, the immediate use of the shoes at the instant the bank was
robbed is easily established. But, to justify the admission of the shoes
on the same theory that would have justified the handkerchief's admission
seems to be too great an extension of the instrumentality cdncept. It does
not seem to be as reasonable to conclude that a pair of shoes is an in-
strumentality of a crime as it is to conclude that the handkerchief was.
As ridiculous as it may sound, a bank could be robbed by "bare-footed"
70. Id. at 450-51.
71. See Shellow, The Continuing Vitality o1 the Gouled Rule: The Search for and
Seizure of Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964).
72. 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958).
73. Shellow, supra note 71, at 179.
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bandits. Whereas, a handkerchief seems to be more closely related to the
commission of the perverted act. Also, another reason for this distinction
can be drawn. If something as incidental to the crime of bank robbery as
the shoes worn by one of the perpetrators is deemed to be an instrumen-
tality of the crime, then it is submitted that the doors would be open to the
admission of almost anything the defendant happened to have been
wearing when the robbery was perpetrated. If shoes are deemed essential
to walking in and leaving the bank, and if walking in and leaving with
shoes on is deemed essential to the crime's commission, then a jacket
worn by a perpetrator to keep him "warm" would also have to be deemed
essential. This conclusion would be the same for any of the many items
a person may wear. Thus, instead of truly essential articles like guns,
masks, and money bags, etc., being the subject of seizures, the list
would also include the dirty T-shirt a witness happened to see a perpe-
trator wearing, a lock of hair which may have dropped to the ground
(since hair is needed to keep the head warm and since keeping the head
warm is essential to a "comfortable" bankrobbery, hair would be as essen-
tial an instrumentality as shoes). In so extending the Rule, perhaps there
would be nothing left which could be considered "non-seizable." Thus,
for the reasons stated, both Morrison and Guido amply show the con-
fusion and possible misapplications of the Gouled Rule which exist.
In any discussion of possible over-extension of the Gouled Rule by
the federal courts, United States v. Boyette, 4 should be mentioned. This
case was a prosecution for the procuring of interstate transportation of
a woman for the purposes of prostitution. At the brothel, the prostitutes
kept records of their earnings on guest checks, the kind commonly used
by restaurants. Pursuant to a valid arrest with a warrant, the agents
discovered three of these checks in one of the rooms of the brothel.
The court admitted these checks as instrumentalities of the crime. This
determination by the court can not be substantiated by the facts or
applicable law. The crime charged was the procuring interstate trans-
portation of a woman for purposes of prostitution, not prostitution itself.
The court stated: "They [checks] were, however, instrumentalities used
in the operation of the brothel, the general criminal enterprise of which
the interstate transportation of women was but a part."75 Thus, the
court admitted the instrumentalities used in the commission of a crime
which was an essential element in the crime under proscution. In other
words, the court admitted evidence of an element of the crime charged.
Such an action by the court extends the Gouled Rule to the point of
destruction. Admitting evidence of a crime is totally against the express
words of the Gouled decision. Such a conclusion is especially necessary
in light of the fact that positively no relationship could be established
74. 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 844 (1962).
75. Id. at 95.
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between the admitted guest checks and the defendants. The court stated:
"These pieces of paper have no incriminating declarations of the defen-
dants. They were a portion of the records, maintained by others, upon
the basis of which the defendants divided the spoils of their criminal
activity. 76 The Gouled Rule is a rule of constitutional law. It is not a
simple statute or rule of common law which the courts are free to change
at will, notwithstanding the function of precedent in. our system. The
court, in Boyette, to have admitted this evidence of an element of the
crime charged, extended the instrumentality concept beyond the express
limits of the Gouled Rule.
APPLICATION OF THE GOULED RULE TO THE STATES
The Gouled Rule has been held to be based upon both the fourth
amendment freedom from illegal searches and seizures, and the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, since both of
these amendments were originally limitations on the federal government
only, basing the Rule upon either amendment would not have made it
applicable to the states. Now, with the application to the states of both
the fourth amendment standards of the reasonableness of searches and
seizures17 and the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, 8
it should necessarily follow that the Gouled Rule is now applicable to
the states.
While most of the state courts which have faced the issue, have
accepted the Rule unhesitatingly,79 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
quite recently refused to do so. In State v. Bisaccia,80 the defendant was
charged with armed robbery. Two men were involved in the offense; one
was caught fleeing while the other "conveniently" left a pair of footprints
in some muddy soil. Plaster casts were made of these prints. Pursuant to
a search warrant, the defendant's apartment was searched, and a pair of
shoes was uncovered. Obviously, the analogy between this case and the
Guido case is unmistakable. Thus, the state court did have federal
precedent upon which to render the shoes admissible as an instrumen-
tality. However, in admitting the shoes, the court refused to accept the
Gouled Rule. First, the court threw out the property [right-to-possession]
rationale for the Rule, stating:
Moreover, the question whether the article seized is the fruit of
the crime, or is contraband, or has been forfeited by evil use,
76. Ibid.
77. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
78. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52 (1964).
79. Commonwealth v. Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 664 (1963); Commonwealth v.
Laudate, 345 Mass. 169, 186 N.E.2d 598 (1962).
80. 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965).
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would frequently depend upon the outcome of the very pro-
ceeding in which it is offered to prove guilt. Yet we permit its
use against the accused without prior trial as to his right to
possess it, a course which is indefensible if in truth the State's
right to use the article depends upon proof that the property
right reposes in the State or someone else. 81
Then, after discussing the appropriate federal cases including Boyd,
Gouled and Marron, the court concluded that the Rule is only applicable
to searches of private papers: "There is a marked difference between
private papers and other objects in terms of the underlying value the
Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. As we have said, private papers are
almost inseparable from the privacy and security of the individual." 2 And,
the court also concluded that even some searches of papers may be con-
stitutional and cited Marron, Lejkowitz, Davis and others as authority
for this proposition. Finally, the court reasoned that since the search for
tangibles other than papers involves none of the hazards involved in
rummaging through private papers, the Gouled Rule should not be appli-
cable. The court then stated:
When that rule [Gouled] or any other subsidiary rule evolved
in the application of the Fourth's prohibition against unreason-
ableness is sought to be applied beyond the setting in which
the subsidiary rule was devised, we must measure the proposed
application against the basic test laid down in the Amendment
and ask whether the search or seizure is unreasonable.8 3
The court also held that the Gouled Rule was simply an application of
the rule of unreasonableness to the specific subject matter involved,
namely private papers.
The significance of this state court decision is twofold. First, "the
sweeping mandates of Boyd, Gouled, Lefkowitz, and Harris"4 are
expressly limited to paper documents. The United States Supreme Court
itself has never expressly limited the Gouled Rule in such a way. Secondly,
in developing "working rules governing arrests and searches and sei-
zures,"8 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected the whole body of
federal precedent on the basis that it is bound by the federal Constitution
to determine that a search and seizure are valid according to the criterion
of reasonableness. If the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution
as calling for the Gouled Rule, then it would seem to follow that this
Rule itself sets the standards for reasonableness called for by the fourth
81. Id. at 506, 213 A.2d at 187.
82. Id. at 510, 213 A.2d at 191.
83. Id. at 511, 213 A.2d at 192.
84. Supra note 73.
85. Ker v. California, supra note 77, at 34.
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amendment. Therefore, it should necessarily follow that since the federal
courts have already interpreted the Constitution in the area of searches
and seizures as calling for the Gouled Rule, then the state courts should
be bound by this standard. It is no defense to this argument to state that
Ker v. California" grants to the states the right to develop "working
rules" in this area. Developing "working rules" is an entirely different
proposition from changing constitutional rules. What is meant by "working
rules" is not clearly understood. However, surely it does not mean that a
state court is free to disregard at will a constitutional rule for which
precedent has been in existence for more than fifty years. And, this state
court, taking upon itself to expressly limit the Gouled Rule and in
calling for its own determination of what should be the rule in this area,
is actually changing a constitutional doctrine. This right belongs only
to the United States Supreme Court.8 7
Ronald H. Heck
86. Supra note 77.
87. For another case in which a state court refused to follow the Rule, see People v.
Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108 (1966).
